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NEW SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA "DISCOVERS" MAO TSE-TUNG

Although both the first and second editions of the Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (Large Soviet Encyclopedia) summarize the history of Chinese Communism, under entries headed "Communist Party of China," they contain varying estimates of the role of Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese Communist movement. This report attempts to show how thoroughly the "encyclopedic" estimate of Mao's role has been revised in the second edition. This is done by presenting, in parallel columns, parts of the texts of two articles from the 1936 and 1953 editions of the encyclopedia concerning corresponding periods in the history of the Chinese Communist Party up to 1936, and by commenting on some of the significant differences between these articles.

General Characteristics

In the first edition the entry on the Chinese Communist Party is a section of the article entitled "China," but in the second edition this entry appears in its own right as a separate article (as is true for all other Communist parties). The first edition covers the Chinese Communist movement up through 1936, the date of publication of Volume 32, in which the account appeared. The article on the Communist Party of China in the second edition of the encyclopedia, appears in Volume 22, published in the fall of 1953, and treats the history of Chinese Communism up to that time. The article in the first edition was written by a group of scholars under the direction of Pavel Mif -- a leading Soviet authority on China, head of the Sun Yat-sen Academy in Moscow in the late 1920's, and Comintern delegate to China in the early 1930's. Author of the article in the second edition is A. A. Martynov -- probably the Col. A. Martynov who reviewed volume 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian edition of Mao Tse-tung's Collected Works in the 1 December 1953 Krasnaya Zvezda, organ of the Ministry of Defense USSR.

Aside from these technical differences, comparison of the articles on the Chinese Communist Party in the first and second editions of the encyclopedia shows a sharp contrast in their evaluations of Mao Tse-tung's role in the Chinese Communist movement. The 1953 edition assigns to Mao the outstanding role in the history of Chinese Communism, holding him up as the leading proponent of the "correct" Marxist-Leninist analysis of the revolution, whose strategic and tactical formulations could not be successfully executed, because of various "deviationists" within the party leadership, until he gained formal control of the party in January 1935. In contrast, the 1936 article contains but two cursory references to Mao, without the slightest suggestion that he was the orthodox Marxist-Leninist champion in China or that he had devised any revolutionary strategy or tactics. The earlier article in fact, gives the impression that from 1930 through 1936 the leading Chinese advocate of the "correct" Marxist line for China was Wang Ming (pseudonym for Ch'en Shu-yu), head of the Chinese Communist Party in 1931-1932 and subsequently Chinese delegate to the Comintern -- the same Wang Ming who is ~~captured~~ in the 1953 article for his "left-deviationism," which allegedly caused grave harm to the Chinese Communist cause between 1931 and 1935.

Among other differences between the two accounts regarding the estimate of Mao Tse-tung's role in the revolutionary movement are the greater emphasis given in the 1936 account to the role of Stalin and the Comintern in the Chinese revolution, and to Communist endeavors among the urban proletariat, and the difference in the bibliographical references in the two articles. The 1936 version repeatedly refers to and quotes from Stalin's analyses of the revolution and various Comintern decisions on it, making clear that these decisions were the impetus behind every strategic and tactical line adopted by the Chinese Communist

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Party; the 1953 version contents itself with a general statement at the beginning about the aid given the Chinese Communists by Lenin's writings on "national-colonial revolutions," the defeat of Trotskyite views on the Chinese revolution by Stalin, and the "continual aid" given the Chinese Communist Party by the Comintern.

The 1936 account has no references to any of Mao's works on the Chinese revolution. The references in the body of the article are exclusively to publications of Stalin's speeches and Comintern decisions on the revolution and of Wang Ming's formulation of united front tactics for the Chinese Communists in 1935, and the bibliography lists materials from generally the same sources. The 1953 account contains references only to Mao Tse-tung's speeches and writings, and has no bibliography. Further, in its endorsement of the Maoist strategy of conducting the Chinese revolution in the countryside, the second edition omits the concern voiced in the first edition for Chinese Communist endeavors among the urban proletariat after 1927.

Origins of the Communist Party of China

The first reference to Mao Tse-tung in both accounts of the Chinese Communist Party appears in the same context -- that of Mao's role as one of the leaders of the socialist study groups which arose in China after World War I. The 1953 account, however, gives more prominence to Mao by listing his name first among the organizers of these groups and by omitting the names of two others mentioned in the earlier account as well as the earlier reference to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's important Communist-oriented Shanghai group. The following are the pertinent passages from the first and second editions of the encyclopedia. (All translations will follow the paragraphing of the original articles, with the omission of an entire paragraph indicated by a full line of dots. All underlining is as in the original.)

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"... The founders of and principal participants in the first revolutionary groups came from the radical intelligentsia which took part in anti-imperialist movement after the war and the Versailles Peace Treaty (Li Ta-chao, Mao Tse-tung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, et al.), and they began establishing contact with the workers. Feeling the enormous influence of the Great October Proletarian Revolution in Russia and of the successful struggle of the proletariat in the USSR against imperialist intervention, they turned to the study of Marxism, and in 1920 Communist groups began to emerge in various provinces in China. Besides the Shanghai group, headed by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Communist organizations arose in Hunan, Peiping, Canton, Hankow, and other cities, and also abroad among Chinese emigrants (in France and other countries)." (p 679)

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"The Communist Party of China was established under the conditions of an upsurge in the anti-imperialist, antifeudal movement, which had begun in China on 4 May 1919 under the direct influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution..., when the Chinese proletariat began to emerge on the arena of the political struggle as an independent political force. On 1 July 1921, in Shanghai there was illegally held a congress of representatives of Marxist circles and groups which had arisen in 1920 in the large cities of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, Li Ta-chao (q.v.), and other figures of the revolutionary movement." (p 200)

Communist-Kuomintang Alliance

In its discussion of the 1924-1927 period of the Chinese Revolution, which was the period of the Kuomintang-Communist Party alliance, the second edition of the encyclopedia gives Mao Tse-tung full credit for carrying out the struggle against Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other "deviationists," and points to two of his works

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written in these years as vital in this respect. The first edition says nothing about Mao's role in this struggle, referring only to the part Stalin and the Comintern played in exposing these errors.

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"The number of those who were organized into peasant unions by the beginning of 1927 reached several million.... By the Fifth Congress (in May 1927), the Chinese Communist Party contained about 60,000 members, of whom more than half were workers. These successes could have been achieved only on the basis of the complete defeat of the Trotskyite line.... However, the Chinese Communist Party did not avoid serious errors in these years, errors mainly of a right-opportunist character, which testified to the great influence of the national bourgeoisie on the least stable elements of the Communist Party, especially on its Ch'en Tu-hsiu leadership. Thus, the lessons of the first attempt of the Chinese bourgeoisie to restrain the revolution... were not sufficiently taken into account by the Communist Party, which had not anticipated, in spite of the warning of the Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the inevitability of a significant regrouping of class forces.... When the critical days of April 1927 arrived and it was clear that Chiang Kai-shek was leading the movement of the national bourgeoisie to the camp of militarism and imperialism, the leadership of the Communist Party did not organize mass resistance to Chiang Kai-shek's coup in Shanghai....

"The tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in this stage [the Communist-Wuhan Kuomintang stage, April-July 1927] were formulated by Comrade Stalin in the following manner: [quotation follows].

"In this period the Communist Party of China was successful in enlarging the organization of the proletariat and in rousing the broad peasant masses in southern China... to agrarian revolution. However, it was successful in this in spite of its leadership, which was sliding towards opportunism in this period.

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"After the events of 30 May 1925... when the national-liberation movement unfolded throughout the country, the working class, led by the Chinese Communist Party, continued to march in the vanguard of the revolution. Thanks to the heroic efforts of the Communists and the revolutionary elements of the Kuomintang, the national-revolutionary army, undertaking in July 1926 the Northern Expedition (q.v.), shattered the troops of the militarists in central China. The Northern Expedition was accompanied by an intensification of the revolutionary movement of the people. The membership of the Chinese Communist Party rose to 58,000. The number of workers and employees organized in trade unions reached 2.8 million; about 10 million peasants were organized in peasant unions. All these successes were achieved by the organizations of the Chinese Communist Party in spite of the opportunist line which Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other Trotskyites and rightist elements, who had insinuated themselves into the leadership of the Communist Party, were conducting. In the struggle with Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other deviationists, Mao Tse-tung steadfastly defended Marxist-Leninist theory, strategy, and tactics. In works written during this period -- On Classes of Chinese Society (1926) and Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province (1927) -- Mao Tse-tung made a Marxist analysis of the classes of Chinese society and alignment of class forces in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution. Defining the social character of the national (middle) bourgeoisie, its ambivalent attitude toward the revolution, and the inevitability of its constant vacillation, Mao decisively rebuffed Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other right-opportunists, who overestimated the role of the bourgeoisie in the revolution, and he showed that only the Chinese working class could and should lead the anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolution. At the same time, Mao showed, on the basis of an analysis of the peasant movement, the incorrectness and harmfulness of the views of the right- and 'left'-opportunists, who did not see the development

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"...The number of workers and employees organized into trade unions reached 2,850,000. In Hunan Province the number of organized peasants exceeded 5 million, while in Hupeh Province 2.2 million had entered peasant unions by the middle of May 1927. Communists participated in the central government at Hunan as well as in provincial governments.... Communists led armed peasant self-defense units in the villages and workers' pickets in the cities.

"All this was achieved by the Party mainly because of the defeat of the wrecking line of the Trotskyites-Zinovievites, which demanded that Communists immediately break with the left Kuomintang and prematurely raise the slogan of soviets.

"The policy of the Comintern, directed toward a struggle for the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry and agrarian revolution, was opposed not only by the Trotskyites and the Zinovievites, but also by the rightists (Ch'en Tu-hsiuist elements) in the Chinese Communist Party, who were promoting the defeat of the Communist Party and the worker-peasant movement in the Wuhan stage of the revolution by their opportunist policy....

"The decisive role in the struggle of the Comintern against right-opportunist and 'leftist' errors in questions of the Chinese revolution belongs to Comrade Stalin. On the example of China, Comrade Stalin theoretically developed and augmented Lenin's teaching on the national-colonial question as an integral part of the general question of the world proletarian revolution.

"With surpassing clarity and with consideration of all its peculiarities, Comrade Stalin determined the motive forces and the basic stages in the development of the Chinese revolution....

"Fighting on two fronts for the purity of the only correct Leninist line, Comrade Stalin completely shattered the right-opportunist, liquidationist, and counterrevolutionary Trotskyite views on the problems of the Chinese revolution....

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in China of a tremendous peasant revolution and the necessity for the working class of China to lead the revolutionary struggle of the landless peasants and those with little land -- the true allies of the working class.

"The traitorous opportunist line of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other deviationists facilitated the counterrevolutionary coup of the right-Kuomintangists in April 1927. After Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary coup, the Chinese Communist Party, collaborating with the Wuhan leadership of the Kuomintang, carried out a line for the further development of the revolution. The revolution as a whole entered into a higher phase of its development, into the phase of an agrarian movement. At the Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Hankow (April-May 1927), a decision was adopted on the development of the worker and peasant movement in the new stage of the revolution, and the right-opportunist line of Ch'en Tu-hsiu was subjected to criticism. Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and others devoted to Leninism, the Chinese Communist Party, in spite of the perfidious line of the opportunists, was successful in expanding and strengthening the organization of the proletariat and in rousing millions of peasants for the agrarian revolution." (pp 200,201)

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"...Opportunists in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, led by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, impeded the revolutionary movement, disarming the proletariat, leaving the workers and peasants without revolutionary leadership, and playing into the hands of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie. This was one of the reasons for the defeat of the revolutionary movement in 1927. Under these conditions the Extraordinary August Conference of 1927 (in Hankow) was called. The conference, with the help of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, severely criticizing errors committed in the past and removing the opportunist leadership from its post, charted a consistent course for the agrarian revolution, a course for an armed uprising, for the overthrow of the now counterrevolutionary government of the Kuomintang and for the acquisition of power by the workers and peasants." (pp 684-688)

Second Phase of the Chinese Revolution

The treatment accorded the 1928-1936 period of the Chinese revolution in the two editions of the Soviet encyclopedia illustrates perhaps best of all the sharp difference between the contemporary and retrospective Soviet evaluation of Mao Tse-tung as a Chinese Communist leader. For it was precisely during those years that Mao evolved and put into practice as a cohesive whole the basic elements of his strategy for seizing power in China. This strategy comprised organizing the revolution in the countryside, creating regular armed forces of the revolution, and establishing viable territorial bases in the rural areas in which to defend the achievements of the revolution and from which to expand the revolution until all of China should be engulfed. Moreover, it was during those years that a Soviet government was established in China with Mao Tse-tung as its head (November 1931); that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party moved from Shanghai to Jui-chin, Hangsi Province (1931-32), which was the seat of the Soviet government; that Mao's revolutionary strategy actually became the strategy of the Chinese revolution; and that Mao, whether or not he did take over formal leadership of the Party in January 1935, as the Chinese Communist line now claims, became the actual leader of the Chinese revolution.

The article on the Chinese Communist Party in the 1953 edition of the Soviet encyclopedia discusses this period of the Chinese revolution in strictly Maoist terms, i.e., Mao's strategy was the only correct one from 1928 on and was a consistent interpretation of responsible Party decisions, but various "deviationists" within the Party leadership from 1931 to 1935 frustrated the successful execution of this strategy and were responsible for the various setbacks suffered by the revolutionary movement. The 1953 article points to Mao's becoming the head of the Soviet government in 1931 and to his taking over of Party leadership in January 1935. In contrast, the 1935 article mentions Mao only in passing as one of the leaders, along with Chu Teh, of the armed detachments which formed the nucleus of the Chinese Red Army. (For the information that Mao headed the Soviet government the reader must turn to the section on China entitled "Historical Sketch," subsection headed "Soviets in China.") This is the second, and last, reference

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to Mao in the entire 1936 article. In this article, it is rather Wang Ming who is identified with the revolutionary march of events in China from 1930 on, since he is credited with being the Chinese Communist leader most responsible for riding the Party of "deviations" in 1930-1931, and no further deviations are cited up through 1936. However, in the 1953 edition, Wang Ming is himself a "deviationist."

Not only is there no reference in the first edition to Mao's strategy of conducting a successful Communist revolution in the Chinese hinterland in isolation from urban centers, but the attention given in the account of the years 1928-1930 to Communist work among the urban proletariat makes it clear that such a strategy was not contemplated by Moscow in those years. In this connection it is interesting to note the difference between the two versions of the decisions adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1928. According to the 1936 version, the congress "proclaimed as the basic task the struggle for the masses, particularly the creation of revolutionary trade unions, the organization of work in mass Kuomintang trade unions, etc." (p 688; see translation below). The 1953 account of the decisions of this congress indicates no such emphasis on work with trade unions (see translation below). The attention given in the earlier account to details of the labor movement in the cities in the years 1928-1929 contrasts markedly with the specific statement in the later version that during those years Mao had formulated the strategy of "transferring the main emphasis [literally, center of gravity] of Party work to the rural areas so that the forces of the working class might lead the revolutionary struggle of the peasants" (p 201; see translation below). It is clear from the context of this statement that the "leadership of the peasant revolution by the working class" is merely a formula to meet the requirements of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Moscow's continuing interest in Communist work in the cities is shown in the last statement of the 1936 article: "In Kuomintang territory, where it has been driven deep underground, the Chinese Communist Party, under conditions of the most brutal terror, is leading the broad people's anti-imperialist movement and the strike struggle of the working class." (p 694)

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"The Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (June-July 1928) met during the temporary lull in the revolutionary movement which had arrived after the defeat inflicted by the bourgeois-landlord bloc on the workers and peasants in 1927. In a sharp struggle on two fronts -- against the right-liquidators (supporters of crushed Ch'en Tu-hsiuism) and against putschists and semi-Trotskyites -- the Sixth Congress worked out the political line of the Party, basing its decisions on the following findings of the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, which were later confirmed by the Sixth Comintern Congress: 'The present period of the Chinese revolution is the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which has not been completed from the economic point of view (agrarian revolution and the destruction of feudal relations), or from the point of view of a national struggle against imperialism (unification of China and national independence), or from the point of view of the class nature of the ruling power

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"The Chinese Communist Party in the Period of the Second Civil Revolutionary War (1927-1936). After the Kuomintangists and their government in Wuhan crossed over into the camp of counterrevolution, the Chinese Communist Party, under the assaults of foreign and domestic reaction and after removing Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other opportunists from their leadership (at the Extraordinary Conference of the Central Committee, 7 August 1927), organized a number of uprisings from autumn 1927 through the spring of 1928.... Being rear-guard battles of the revolution, which had suffered a temporary defeat, these uprisings opened the Second Civil Revolutionary War, which was characterized by the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution and the rallying of the multimillion peasant masses around the working class. Considerable harm to the

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(dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry). (The Communist International in Documents, Partizdat, Moscow, 1933, p 763). The [Sixth] Congress [of the Chinese Communist Party] proclaimed as the basic task the struggle for the masses, particularly the creation of revolutionary trade unions, the organization of work in mass Kuomintang trade-union organizations, etc. The Congress proposed a program of unaltered slogans for agrarian revolution in the countryside, correcting the errors of previous decisions. In providing the basis for these decisions and in its tactical conclusions, the Congress did not escape imprecise, erroneous formulations, which were later to give rise to a right-opportunist line on alliance with the kulaks (Li Li-san). Taking into account the specific peculiarities of the development of the Chinese revolution... the Congress gave directions for the creation of armed detachments of workers and peasants for the organization of Soviet authority in that part of the Kuomintang territory where the people's rebellion was successful, for a struggle to preserve the centers of Soviet power and Red Army detachments as strong points of the future revolutionary upsurge.

"The year which followed the Sixth Congress passed with the Communists waging a strenuous battle to restore the Party organizations which had been destroyed by the counterrevolution and demoralized by the right- and 'left'-liquidators and with partisan detachments engaging in selfless encounters to preserve the armed forces and centers of the revolutionary worker-peasant power. A majority of active Party members lost their work during these difficult years. According to the materials of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the maximum number of workers in the entire Party did not exceed 4,000 in many large urban centers... Communist organizational work was not carried on for an extended period of time. After the Wuhan period the number of revolutionary trade unions declined from 734 to 81; driven deep underground, they had no real mass character....

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successful conduct of the Party line was inflicted by the errors of the 'left'-deviationists, who looked upon the uprisings not as defensive battles, directed toward the preservation and strengthening of the revolutionary forces, but as offensive battles. These 'left'-deviationist errors were condemned at the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (July 1928). The Sixth Congress determined that the revolution continued to be bourgeois-democratic in nature. Considering the arrival of a new revolutionary upsurge in the country as inevitable, the Chinese Communist Party carried out the line of winning over the masses in the city and village, of unfolding the agrarian revolution, of establishing revolutionary bases in rural areas, of creating organs of people's power -- organs of an anti-imperialist and antifeudal democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and of the creation and maximum strengthening and increase of the Red Army.

"An outstanding role in the successes of the Chinese Communist Party in the Second Civil Revolutionary War was played by Mao Tse-tung. In his works Why Can Red Power Exist in China (1928), The Struggle in Chinghsan (1928), and others, Mao Tse-tung gave a Marxist analysis of the situation which had developed in China after the temporary defeat of the revolution. Mao Tse-tung showed that the main peculiarities of this situation were the contradictions among the imperialists and ruling classes of China, the ever-increasing enthusiasm of the peasants for the agrarian revolution, the concentration of the large military and police forces of Chiang Kai-shek and the imperialists in the large cities of China and the weakness of their forces in the rural areas. Mao Tse-tung, creatively applying Marxist-Leninist principles to

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"...Counterrevolutionary Trotskyites concluded a bloc with the right-renegades (Ch'en Tu-hsinists) for joint struggle against the Party and the line charted by the Sixth Comintern Congress and the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Under these difficult conditions, the Central Committee elected by the Sixth Congress devoted much effort to restoring Party organizations, strengthening discipline, and consolidating the ties between the central organs and the lower Party periphery.... In 1928, a wave of economic strikes began, which affected up to 300,000 workers. At the end of 1928, and especially in 1929, Communists again led the movement, giving it a more organized form and linking it to the general tasks of the workers' movement. However, work in mass Kuomintang and yellow trade unions was greatly underestimated within the leadership of the Party. There was no struggle to establish a united front of workers and their organizations on the basis of the partial demands of the masses. A situation which to a very great extent hindered the growth of the revolutionary influence of the Communists in Kuomintang territory and transformed the revolutionary trade unions into sectarian organizations.

"... At the end of 1929, and particularly in the beginning of 1930, the revolutionary wave again began to rise in China, and was quickly transformed into a nationwide revolutionary crisis....

"The violent white terror [of the Kuomintang] was not able to suppress the revolutionary struggle of the masses. The number of strikers in the cities rose sharply (in 1930, up to 700,000), while in south China... the struggle of the peasants for land unfolded under Communist leadership. Under these circumstances Communist-led partisan groups multiplied and dozens of counties were affected by this struggle. Even units of a worker-peasant Red Army began to form. The detachments of Communist Tse-tung and Chu Teh in the mountain area of Kiangsi Province became the

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the new peculiar situation in China, worked out the plan for the further development of the Chinese revolution, which provided for transferring the main emphasis of Party work to the rural areas so that the forces of the working class might lead the revolutionary struggle of the peasants and create and enlarge the revolutionary support bases in the rural areas. Mao Tse-tung showed that with correct leadership by the Chinese Communist Party these revolutionary bases could, through a prolonged revolutionary struggle, develop and expand gradually and lead to the victory of the revolution on an all-China scale.

"The Chinese Communists led the agrarian revolution, the building of revolutionary support bases, and the creation of a Red Army.... The Central Worker-Peasant Democratic Republic headed by Mao Tse-tung was established. Led by the strategy and tactics worked out by Mao Tse-tung for the struggle of the revolutionary forces against the superior forces of the enemy, the Red Army and the partisan detachments successfully repelled the armed attacks of Chiang Kai-shek against the revolutionary support bases.

"The 'left'-deviation which arose in the Chinese Communist Party during this period under the leadership of Li Li-san brought serious harm to the revolutionary movement. Not comprehending the character and peculiarities of the new situation, the 'left'-deviationists enticed certain Party organizations onto the path of preparing premature uprisings in large cities, and, ignoring the laws of war and overestimating the might and capabilities of the Red Army, they demanded that the Red Army attack the principal centers of China. The 'left'-deviation of Li Li-san was exposed at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (September 1930).

"Beginning with 1931, the work of the Chinese Communist Party was carried out under circumstances characterized by the beginning of the intervention of Japanese imperialists in China, which called forth a powerful new upsurge of the people's anti-imperialist movement.

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organizational skeleton of this armed struggle of the workers and peasants.... As early as 1930, Soviets, as organs of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry were firmly consolidated in Kiangsu Province, signifying the transition from the period of partisan warfare to the building of a regular worker-peasant Red Army and to the creation of stable Soviet areas, in the territory of which the agrarian peasant revolution under the leadership of the proletariat headed by its vanguard, the Communist Party, had a consistent development.

"Up to the summer of 1930, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in spite of the insufficiently consolidated character of the leadership, which permitted a number of rightist as well as leftist errors, in the main correctly carried out the decisions of the Sixth Congress and achieved considerable success in the work of restoring Party organizations, strengthening ties with the masses, building a worker-peasant Red Army, and enlarging the Soviet areas. However, by the summer of 1930, a section of the leadership of the Central Committee led by Li Li-san began to conduct a 'leftist'-putschist, semi-Trotskyite line. The Li Li-san leadership distorted the Party line on the agrarian revolution in the Soviet areas..., ignored the work to expand the partisan movement and to build a regular, disciplined worker-peasant Red Army, and disregarded the task of strengthening the army's rear, consolidating the Soviet areas and creating a central Soviet government.

"... These errors of the Li Li-san leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party hampered the defeat of the counterrevolutionary Kuomintang offensive against the Soviet areas. The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (September 1930) took a compromising position on the Li Li-san line. This was exploited by the rightist elements in the Party led by Lo Cheng-lung, which attacked the Party line under the liquidationist

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in the country, in which, together with the workers, peasants, and the revolutionary section of the intelligentsia, broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie and certain strata of the national bourgeoisie were also included. The organization of the struggle against the Japanese aggressors became the central activity of the Chinese Communist Party. After the beginning of the occupation of Manchuria, the Chinese Communist Party called upon the people for armed resistance to the interventionists. Under the leadership of the Communists a people's war against the Japanese usurpers unfolded in northeast China and other areas. The government of Chiang Kai-shek, perfidiously surrendering Manchuria to the Japanese imperialists, continued its military campaigns against the revolutionary bases instead of combating Japanese aggression. ... As a result of the serious 'leftist' errors of certain leaders of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Wang Ming [Ch'en Shao-yu] and Po Ku [Ch'in Pang-haien]) the favorable conditions which had developed as a result of the major military successes of the Red Army and the upsurge of the nationwide anti-Japanese movement in the country were not utilized for strengthening the revolutionary movement. The 'leftists' opposed the creation of a united front of workers and peasants with the patriotic circles of the Kuomintang Army and the petty urban and national bourgeoisie and conducted a sectarian policy, refusing to utilize legal and semilegal possibilities of revolutionary struggle in areas under the control of the Kuomintang government. In the revolutionary bases, the 'leftists' committed serious errors in economic policy, and also opposed the tactics of partisan and mobile warfare. This erroneous 'leftist' line, which prevailed in the leading organs for 4 years (January 1931-January 1935), inflicted particularly grave injury on the Party and the revolution. The leftist errors led to serious losses in the organizations of the Chinese Communist Party in the territories under Kuomintang control. As

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slogan of ceasing work on creating a Red Army, abandoning the Soviet areas, etc. Even before the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a struggle had begun in the Shanghai organization under the leadership of Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang Ming) against the Trotskyite line of Li Li-san and, after the Third Plenum, against its compromising position. This valiant struggle for a Bolshevik line helped the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (January 1931), with the help of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, completely to expose Li Li-san and at the same time to crush the right-opportunist (Li Chang-lungist) elements.

"The Fourth Plenum overhauled the personnel of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Party, organizationally ensuring the carrying out of the Comintern line, and turned to the fulfillment of the immediate tasks confronting the Party -- increasing the fighting ability of the Red Army, strengthening its proletarian cadres, organizing a mass campaign in Kuomintang territory for the defense of the Soviet areas, working out a correct economic policy, especially the carrying out of a consistent policy of confiscating landlords' land in the interest of the peasants, liquidating the counterrevolutionary organs in the Soviet areas... improving work in trade unions, especially in the Kuomintang mass trade union organizations, etc. The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party initiated a period of the rapid Bolshevization of the Communist Party and of victories for the Soviet agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution in a considerable portion of Kuomintang territory. The decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party formed the basis of the subsequent decisions of the First Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies of China (see chapter titled 'Soviets in China'). The decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and of the First Congress of Soviets ensured a tremendous upsurge in the mass movement and an increase in the confidence of the millions of toilers in the soviets and the Communist Party, and they led to the victories of the

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a result of the policy of the 'leftists,' the position of the units of the Red Army after the beginning of the fifth armed campaign of Chiang Kai-shek in October 1933 was extremely unfavorable. The Chinese Communist Party adopted a decision to transfer the Red Army units to northwest China. At the beginning of the Long March, the 'leftists' continued to commit gross military errors, as a result of which the Red Army units suffered grave losses. In January 1935, a historic Enlarged Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which took place under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, was called in the city of Tsun-1 (Kweichow Province), at which the errors of the 'leftists' were subjected to sharp criticism, and they were removed from the leadership of the Party. There was formed a new leadership of the Central Committee headed by Mao Tse-tung, who from this time on has continuously headed the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party." (pp 201-202)

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worker-peasant army (which became a mighty armed force) in the struggle against the third, fourth, and fifth Kuomintang campaigns. In these battles and especially in the great march of the main forces of the Red Army from Kiangsi to Szechwan (1934-1935), the soldiers and officers of the Chinese Red Army provided extraordinary examples of heroism and self-sacrifice." (pp. 688-691)

The United Front

The first edition of the encyclopedia considers its account of the history of the Chinese Communist Party with a discussion of the "United front" tactics of the Chinese Communists in 1945 and 1946. Then, the credit for formulating the United front policy in China is given to Wang Ming, setting on the directives of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, at which he headed the Chinese delegation. The 1953 edition of course, makes no reference to Wang Ming in this connection, since it claims that he was one of the "Leftists" who, in addition to committing other errors, opposed an anti-Japanese United front of Communists and "patriotic" Kuomintang elements. The 1977 edition refers only to the United front policy of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which, it had earlier pointed out, Mao Tse-tung headed after 1935, and to Mao's exposition of this policy in two of his works.

First Edition

"From the very beginning of the Japanese intervention, the Soviet government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army proved to be the only force which consistently upheld the national defense and stood for armed resistance to Japan and for the organization of a national-revolutionary liberation war in defense of the territorial integrity and independence of China....

"In Manchuria the Communists actively fought for expanding the partisan movement under the general slogan of organizing an armed resistance to the Japanese violators and establishing people's power. During the defense of Shanghai (1937) the workers, under Communist leadership, fought side by side with the troops and officers of the 19th Army, beginning to put into practice a united people's anti-imperialist front. Nevertheless, these undertakings by the Communist Party and the Soviet government led by it proved to be inadequate for the preparation and development of a national-revolutionary war of defense. As the experience of the Pukien Incident showed, the possibility for organizing joint

Second Edition

"Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Long March was successfully completed. Thus, the Chinese Red Army insured itself of a firm rear in the form of a socialist power, the Soviet Union, and created the possibility of developing a struggle against the Japanese aggressors. After the arrival of the basic units of the Chinese Red Army in Shensi (1935), the Chinese Communist Party intensified the struggle to repulse the Japanese aggressors and strengthen the revolutionary forces. In conformity with the changing situation in China and the regrouping of class forces in the country, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party worked out the strategic and tactical line for the period of struggle against the aggression of the Japanese imperialists. This line was set forth in Mao Tse-tung's works: On the Tactics of Struggle Against Japanese Imperialism (1935), Tasks

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action was underestimated by those political groupings in Kuomintang territory who were ready to participate in a national-liberation war. The turning point in this question, which was a decisive one in the political situation of that time, occurred at the Seventh Comintern Congress, where the Chinese Communist Party's delegation, headed by Wang Ming, boldly, in a Bolshevik manner, and confidently developed a new tactic for the Chinese Communist Party, based on the directive of the Seventh Congress which was adopted on the report of Comrade Dimitroff. According to this directive, the most important task of Communists in colonial and semicolonial countries consisted of appealing to establish an anti-imperialist people's front. Especially in China it is necessary to combine the expansion of the Soviet movement and the strengthening of the armed might of the Red Army with the development of a people's anti-imperialist movement in the entire country.' (Resolutions of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, 1935, p 22)

"In the name of the Chinese delegation, Comrade Wang Ming formulated the necessary change in tactics and the direction of its further development at the Seventh Congress on the following manner: 'Our tactics must consist of appealing, together with the Soviet government of China, to the whole people, to all parties, groups, troops, mass organizations, and to all prominent political and public figures to organize with us an all-China united people's government of national defense.' (Wang Ming, On the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semicolonial Countries and the Tactics of Communist Parties, 1935, p 18)

Soon after the Seventh Congress, the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued an 'Appeal to All the People of China on Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Motherland,' -- a most important document defining the bases of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party, which was designed for the creation of a united anti-imperialist (Anti-Japanese) people's front....

Second Edition

of the Communist Party of China in the Period of the Anti-Japanese War (1937), and others. Taking into account that not only the workers, peasants, and the petty urban bourgeoisie, but also the national bourgeoisie and even certain strata of the comprador bourgeoisie and landlords were opposing the Japanese aggression, the Chinese Communist Party set as the main task the establishment of a broad anti-Japanese national front in the country, the thoroughgoing strengthening of the leading role of the working class in the war against the Japanese usurpers, the strengthening and development of the mass democratic people's movement and of the people's armed forces in the country. The policy worked out by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which combined the mobilization of the people for the struggle against the Japanese aggressors with the simultaneous strengthening and development of the people's democratic forces in the country, became the basis of the activity of the Chinese Communist Party." (p. 202)

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"... In the autumn of 1936, the Chinese Communist party raised the slogan of creating a united all-China democratic republic headed by a parliament...." (pp 691-693)

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